Model Driven Security Policy Automation

On this blog, ObjectSecurity co-founder and CEO Ulrich Lang discusses security policy automation and model-driven security. The aim of this blog is to advocate advance the state of the art in this area through exchange of ideas. - -

Friday, 20 January 2012

Analysis Series: "Security Recommendations for Cloud Computing Providers" (German Federal Office for Information Security)

In this post I would like to share my views of the "Authorisation" section (p. 37 in the English version) of the German Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (Federal Office for Information Security) white paper "Security Recommendations for Cloud Computing Providers (Minimum information security requirements)"(download, German & English). The section states:

The rights management system must ensure that each role may only see the data (including meta-data) required to achieve the task. The access control should be role-based and the roles and authorisations set up should be reviewed regularly. In general, the least privilege model should be used, with users and CSP administrators only possessing the rights that they require to achieve their tasks. Particular attention should be directed here towards privileged users. If the role is that of a CSP administrator, it should be possible to demonstrate that the only data viewed was that which was required for the task. The rights management system should also be capable of fully documenting and monitoring data exports and imports from and to the CSP. Lastly, any particularly critical administration activities, such as installing patches, should only be performed on the four-eye principle

As with most other guidance documents previously analyzed on this blog post series, this section makes strong requirements statements at a high level ("only see the data...required to achieve the task", "least privilege"), but at the same time recommends only less-than-optional technical controls ("access control should be role-based"). As previously identified with other guidance documents, the recommendations fail to address the fact that access control needs to be highly contextual to achieve effective "least privilege" for a particular task. Granting role-based access to some particular job function based on everything that job function might ever potentially need to access for all tasks that job function might ever do is not effective "least privilege!

In order to minimize access rights to exactly what is needed to be accessed ("least privilege") in a particular situation ("task"), the context of the task, as well as other environmental context (such as time of day, crisis level, a particular patient checked into hospital of the treating doctor who wants to access that patient's health record etc).

The fact that this (and other) government issued guidance does not address the issue that traditional access controls (incl. role-based access control) are only partly effective to achieve "least privilege" is unfortunate. It allows enterprises to continue to get away with not really solving the real underlying security challenges they are facing, with customers having to pay the price for the damage caused by these only partly effective security measures.

However, real solutions are available today: Model-driven security policy automation (e.g. OpenPMF) together fine-grained, contextual authorization management (e.g. XACML) help implement real contextual, fine-grained access controls in a manageable way. Model-driven security alleviates the main challenge of authorization management, which is that policies for fine-grained, contextual authorization management are hard to manage and maintain, even for dynamically changing (agile) IT landscapes such as Service Oriented Architectures (SOAs) and Cloud mash-ups. Please feel free to read this blog, our website, or contact me.